Firms’ innovation outcomes depend on their ability to attract and retain talented
inventors. What market frictions prevent the sorting between firms with high innovation
potential and high-productivity inventors? How does this sorting impact aggregate
innovation, growth and welfare? We address these questions both empirically and
theoretically. Empirically, we show that firms facing strong competition in the product
market employ more productive inventors, while less productive inventors tend to be
allocated in concentrated industries. Theoretically, we embed a frictional labor market
for inventors into an endogenous-growth model of strategic innovation. In line with
the data, the model predicts that high-productivity inventors are disproportionately
employed in firms that operate in competitive industries. We then use the model to
quantify the growth and welfare implications of this inventor sorting. Our results
show that matching frictions in the market for inventors impede the allocation of highproductivity inventors to firms with high implementation intensity, and are responsible
for a 32% loss in economic growth. Industrial policies that subsidize R&D spending
relax these frictions by boosting inventor productivity, helping high-quality inventors
reallocate to firms with high implementation incentives. Under optimal subsidies,
growth increases as much as 74 basis points, closing most of the gap in missing growth
caused by frictions in the market for inventors.
Innovative firms rely on external finance to fund their operations, yet debt and equity may play distinct roles in shaping this process. Using balance-sheet and patent-level data on European patenting firms, we document two facts. First, external equity flows to small, young, collateral-poor, faster-growing firms, while debt reaches larger, more collateral-rich firms. Second, real outcomes, including innovation, respond positively to capital inflows, and these responses are substantially larger for external equity. We interpret these facts through a Schumpeterian model of innovation-led growth with financial frictions in which heterogeneous firms finance their operations with retained earnings, debt, and external equity. In the model, financially constrained firms invest less in R&D, because successful innovations are worth less when capital cannot be scaled to exploit them. This gives rise to selection: equity reaches the firms where new capital has the highest return and its effect on innovation is largest. Financial frictions also depress firm entry, further reducing growth. The calibrated model matches the dynamic correlation of patenting to capital injections and its heterogeneity across financing sources. We use the model to quantify the aggregate effects of financial frictions and evaluate growth policies. In the perfect credit benchmark, growth is 1.25 percentage points higher than in the baseline; frictionless equity markets recover 13% of this gap. Government subsidies to external equity deliver the largest welfare gains at low levels of government spending, while R&D subsidies become more effective as spending rises.